A Lack of Fundamentals in a Simplified Game

“There’s more fundamental teaching done now than I had to do when we were a championship-caliber team,” Greg Popovich said recently.

My immediate reaction was twofold:

First, the Spurs are a young, inexperienced, bad team; of course, there is more fundamental teaching than when he coached multiple veteran future Hall of Fame players on championship-contending teams.

Second, yes, players are more individually skilled, but lack some basketball IQ and/or tactical skills. I wrote about the simplification of the game and the lack of tactical acumen late last year.

As I thought more, and read more responses, I am less certain. Aesthetically, it feels this way, and I do not want to question or debate Popovich. I respect his viewpoint as the best coach of the last 40 years. The game certainly has changed, with tactics and strategy heavily influenced by analytics.

The offensive tactics and skills have developed to such an extent, defenses have shifted from trying to stop offenses to conceding small advantages to prevent big advantages because stopping a ram screen into a Spanish pick-and-roll with a strong-side exit with four 35% three-point shooters around a rim-running seven-footer is nearly impossible, especially in the regular season.

The championship-winning Spurs famously introduced the Hammer action, often setting up the baseline drive and drift in a timeout. Now many teams at all levels run Hammer action as a regular end of quarter action without a timeout.

Whereas my initial instinct was to nod and agree with Pop, I think our expectations have increased dramatically. Players are bigger, stronger, faster, and individually more skilled, and we expect more from them, even at a time when the league trends younger (despite the presence of a few players like LeBron who seem not to age).

The game has changed, and one change is structure: The decline of set plays and continuity offenses in favor of simple actions and player decision-making: SABA basketball. Ironically, Popovich is as responsible as anyone for this style. Many called the early teens Spurs and Popovich’s .5-second basketball “beautiful basketball” and set out to emulate this style of advantage-based basketball as opposed to running more and more complicated sets for specific players.

We ran sets when I played. We followed directions. We did not make decisions. We practiced patterns five-vs-zero every day for entire seasons, and all three levels (freshmen, junior varsity, and varsity) often ran the same plays. We did not read the defense to decide whether to curl or flare. We did not even run on-ball screens on any organized team.

Now, players whip cross-court one-handed passes to the opposite corner to find a 40% three-point shooter with time and space. These were mistakes when I played, then advanced skills, and now fairly common fundamentals, but we argue players do not know how to play the game or they lack fundamentals.

Which fundamentals? I dislike the direction of the NBA, and I question if our process to develop players is as good as it can be, but which fundamentals are not being developed?

Low post, back-to-the-basket offense certainly has been de-emphasized, but also the basics of post play — pivots and pump fakes (see Fake Fundamentals, Volume 4) — are more universal. Rather than start with a pass into the low post and a back to the basket move, players start away from the basket, drive toward the rim, and stop, using pivots and pump fakes to create their shots. The best low-post players now are not traditional centers, but players such as Jalen Brunson and Jrue Holiday.

The game has changed, but the basic fundamentals persist and are more widely-used, not the domain of specialists. The stride-stop, pump fake, pivot and half hook, often called a Rondo, often was whistled for traveling violations when I taught it to young players 15-20 years ago  (as the Steve Nash Hook) because it was different; now, youth players make this move in games under pressure without thinking twice.

Off-ball movement and screens have been de-emphasized, but players do not lack those skills. Stephen Curry and Klay Thompson are as good as anyone in history at using and shooting off screens. Jordan Hawkins and Demond Bane are young players who excel off screens.

However, coaches and analysts realized standstill catch-and-shoot corner three-point attempts have a higher efficiency than shots off the move, and especially two-point attempts off the move (which is largely how we devised the offense in Blitz Basketball in 2001).

We ran the Flex to get elbow jump shots off a curl from the block when I played; now teams penetrate to force help and kick out to standstill shooters, employing the best of the .5-second offense Popovich popularized. We may find the pin down for the middie to be more aesthetically-pleasing or even a higher skill level than a standstill catch-and-shoot three-point attempt, but it is less efficient. Forsaking these play types is not a sign of skill degradation but an overall evolution toward more efficient basketball, for better or worse.

The last 20 years have seen a switch to more specialized individual training and drills, and consequently, individual skills are better than ever. The most basic fundamental is free-throw shooting, and the NBA is on pace for a second consecutive season of setting the all-time record for league-wide free-throw shooting percentage (currently 78.5%). Three-point percentage (36.6%) is currently a fraction off the all-time record (36.7%). Turnover percentage is currently on pace to set the record for lowest percentage at 12.1%. Offensive rating is as high as it has ever been. Assists are at all-time high. Three-point field goals made are at an all-time high. The game is more offensive, and dare I say skilled, than ever.

Individual skills have certainly improved, especially in non-superstars and bigger role players, but statistics likely oversell the improvement. The statistical achievements have coincided with other factors. The NBA is more international than ever; it is harder to make an NBA roster. The number of international players has increased from 57 in 2000 to 125 this season. There are roughly 450 NBA players; the top 400 USA players in 2000 were in the NBA, whereas now one must be among the top 325 players. The difficulty of making the league is one measure of improvement over time.

Additionally, rules have changed, officially and unofficially, over the last few decades, and these rules favor the offense. The charge circle, legal guarding position, the gather, flagrant foul for stepping under an airborne shooter, and other rules and interpretations favor offense, especially perimeter, dribble-penetration offense and shooting. The defensive three-second rule and the deeper three-point line increase the available space compared to NCAA and FIBA basketball, again favoring the offense.

The style of play has benefitted skill. The pace-and-space style favors quick decision-making and quicker shot attempts. I looked for short clips of 90s fundamental basketball, and the first possession was Michael Jordan holding the ball straight over his head for two seconds at the three-point line without even looking at the basket; that is an automatic turnover in my practices! Coaches emphasize early, open shots rather than running the play or isolating players to run down the shot clock. Attempting shots earlier in possessions decreases turnovers and improves offensive efficiency.

The traditional approach was captured by legendary University of North Carolina Head Coach Dean Smith: “The biggest reason I’m against simply running the ball down and shooting the first shot available is that the defense doesn’t have time to foul you.” The more modern approach is offered by Clovis West High School Head Coach, and creator of the Dribble-Drive-Motion, Vance Walberg who has said the goal is to shoot before the team has a chance to commit a turnover.

According to an old article on 82games, the earlier a team shoots, the greater the points per possession, as shots in the first 10 seconds of the shot clock are more efficient than any other segment. The statistics are biased due to fast-break baskets, but possessions lasting between 11 and 15 seconds are more efficient than between 16 and 20 seconds. Coaches acceptance of and desire for early shots has changed the offensive emphasis, the required skills, scouting, and tactical understanding.

The analytical approach to coaching and playing styles has benefitted skilled players, which has elevated players’ skills and created a selection bias for skilled players. It is difficult to imagine a player such as Walker Kessler lasting into the 20s in the NBA Draft in the late 1990s, especially after I watched Joe Klein selected in the lottery as a Sacramento Kings fan. However, the analytics favor shooting, playmakers, and length on the perimeter, not post players. NBA teams favor generalists in the lottery, not specialists.

Team Building with Generalists

Therefore, while individual skills certainly have improved, not all of the credit goes to individual improvement or skill development. Can you imagine a healthy Larry Bird in this era with the freedom to shoot? A career 37.6% three-point shooter, he never attempted more than 3.3 three-pointers per game in a season. Duncan Robinson plays off the bench and has averaged 7.3 three-point attempts per game for his career. Even a relatively recent former player such as Steve Nash, who helped usher in the pace-and-space era with Don Nelson in Dallas and Mike D’Antoni in Phoenix, said:

“Nellie [launched] my career in pushing me to be aggressive and score the ball. But I never took it to the heights that the numbers validate in today's day and age, where I probably should have shot the ball 20 times a game. It probably would have made a lot more sense.”

The environment today is more conducive to shooting, especially three-point shooting, as the makes, attempts, and percentages demonstrate.

Coaches favored defense through the 90s, and almost always played the better defender over the better offensive player, which is how unskilled bigs such as Klein managed to play in the NBA. The geometry was different, as most of the game was played within 15-20 feet from the basket, whereas now actions start 40 feet from the basket because players such as Curry, Dame Lillard, Trae Young, and others pull up and shoot league-average percentages from 35 feet. The math and the geometry change the physiology, anthropometrics, and physical prototypes teams seek to acquire. Despite Jokic leading the Nuggets to the 2023 NBA Championship and Joel Embiid scoring at will for the 76ers, recent NBA trades have targeted a 6’9 slasher (Siakam) and a 6’2 scorer (Rozier).

The move toward skill over size and defensive versatility (guarding multiple positions, switchability) over specialists (shot blocker, lockdown, backcourt presser) has changed the league-wide defensive approach. With so many shooters, teams fear rotations and open catch-and-shoot three-pointers, especially from the corners. With the space and the passing skills of most players, including centers, offenses easily exploit traditional defensive coverages such as hard hedges, traps, and icing. Did Hall of Fame centers such as Hakeem Olajuwon, David Robinson, or Patrick Ewing ever short roll, receive the pass out of the trap at the top of the key, and throw a lob to a baseline cutter or whip a pass to the opposite corner? Today’s centers, even role players, regularly make these players. We expect these plays to be made; they are no longer amazing plays! Our expectations have increased.

For several years, defenses used drop coverage and dared teams to make the less efficient mid-range shots and floaters, while avoiding rotations by defending the pick-and-roll two-vs-two. Offenses adjusted and set the screens further from the basket, turning open midrange shots into three-pointers or forcing the big in drop coverage beyond the three-point line, opening the basket area for dribble penetration and cuts.

Now, defenses have conceded the battle and teams overwhelmingly favor switching, as the switch prevents rotations and the off-the-dribble pull-ups that drop coverage yields. Teams give up the small advantage, the mismatch, to prevent the big advantages: Straight-line drives, catch-and-shoot three-pointers, and rotations/scrambling. Teams employ more zones, as they function similar to switching, but the defense can determine the locations of the defenders. Few coaches 30 years ago used zones, especially as a tactic to combat open three-point attempts. They gave up too many shots, but today’s coaches are interested in dictating the types of shots conceded, not trying to stop all shots. Offenses are too good to stop all shots.

Switching tends to simplify offense. The entire purpose of offensive actions is to create an advantage. Teams run on-ball screens and defenses switch, which creates the advantage. Then, the offense looks to exploit the advantage, usually by utilizing individual skills. The game may not be as aesthetically-pleasing, especially to those raised on back-to-the basket post moves, triple threats, and continuity offenses with a 45-second shot clock in college basketball, but it is difficult to argue with the offense’s success in terms of points and efficiency. If we measure the game by points scored, and players do this better than ever, how can we suggest these players also lack fundamentals or do not understand the game?

The differences, I think, are more qualitative, and not skill-related. I spoke recently to a coach about a 40% three-point shooter and excellent defender. Rather than be a bigger, more athletic, better shooting Bruce Bowen, filling the three-and-D role to a tee, he wants to be like KD with more on-ball, playmaking, and off-the-dribble possessions. He is, at best, the fourth option on his team; can you imagine Bowen looking at Tim Duncan, Tony Parker, and Manu Ginobili and saying, “Yeah, I need more playmaking reps to play like Dwyane Wade”? As the skill level increases, and teams fill rosters with more highly-skilled players, role acceptance, shot allocation, and shot selection are more difficult. I imagine this frustrates veteran coaches.

These roles were easier in previous generations. There were more specialists. Recent online banter centered around the Thunder’s Jalen Williams, as some argued they preferred him to Minnesota’s Anthony Edwards. The Thunder would revolve around Chet Holmgren and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander in previous generations, and Williams would have few opportunities to prove he was even in the same discussion as Edwards. Now, he self-creates for game-winning shots, much like Atlanta’s Dejounte Murray who would be viewed as a defensive specialist deferring to Trae Young in previous generations.

Coaches feel players should know who should attempt more shots and accept their roles, but teams play so many skilled players, it is difficult to anoint a definitive pecking order. Miami acquired Terry Rozier who was seventh in the NBA in touches per game and eighth in time of possession, ahead of players like Dame Lillard, SGA, Devin Booker, and Steph Curry, according to NBA.com. Now, he plays with all-stars like Bam and Butler, and shooters like Herro, Robinson, and Jaquez. Who defers to whom?

The negative, of course, is non acceptance of a role or a role player trying to be too aggressive, but the upside is teams cannot lock down Butler because of Herro, KD because of Booker, or Tatum because of Brown. Every good team has two or three generalist playmakers and shot makers, but managing the egos and the roles is difficult with so much individual skill and talent.

These advantages place more pressure on defenders. I watched a highlight of a player I know driving the lane for a dunk in the half-court. Traditionally, we would point to this possession as bad defense and a lack of understanding, missed rotations, and more. There were mistakes, but who helps on the ball in a Chicago action?

Do you switch and create a mismatch for the post? Do you leave the 40% three-point shooter in the corner? These defensive decisions are harder when every player is an offensive threat. The mistake is easy to identify on film after the game, but in the moment, who helps when everyone is a shot maker? If I help and stop the ball, and my coach substitutes for me because my man knocks down the open three-point shot, am I likely to help again next time?

My purpose is not to argue with Popovich, as I have written about the need to improve the developmental experience for 20 years. However, some of the complaints from coaches and the older generation are due to the evolution of the game due to skill development, rule changes, analytics, and more. The game has simplified, but not because players lack fundamentals or IQ, although that may or may not be true too. The changing game may have reduced the requirement to know some things, although it has increased the importance of other things, such as quick decision-making, processing the court quicker, playing in space, dribbling and passing skills, and shot making. Players may struggle with certain things they once learned easily or earlier, I don’t really know, but our expectations also are much higher now than in the 1990s, as an example.