Learning from the Ignite, transfer portal, and European academies
Are prep schools or junior colleges the solution to better player development?
The NBA decided to shut down the G-League Ignite at the same time many argue the problem with basketball in the United States is a lack of academies. Ignite was not really an academy per se, but served a similar purpose as many academies abroad, which collect a country’s best teenage talents to practice and play together in men’s (professional) leagues.
The Ignite provided an alternative for elite players to develop while getting paid because the NCAA prohibited payment at the time, and the NBA insisted on players being one year past their high-school graduations to enter the NBA Draft. The Ignite was a hastily-thrown together attempt to appease everyone, which ultimately failed to please anyone.
A different option was necessary because we rely on the school system and school ages to determine progression and promotion, not talent, skill, and maturity (physical, psychological, and emotional). The inability to progress based on individual qualities as opposed to age designations may be the biggest weakness of our current system, at least in terms of the elite end of the development pathways.
Cooper Flagg, as an example, would play with adults already if sports were disentangled from academics. Instead, he played two additional years of high-school basketball after being declared the number one prospect and must play one year in college. What do players gain from high-school and AAU competition once it is clear they have outgrown the level, but have nowhere else to play because they are restrained by age and grade restrictions?
College basketball, while not perfect, likely is sufficient training and competition for most 19-23 year olds who are no ready yet or not good enough for the NBA. The EuroLeague certainly is a higher level of competition than NCAA basketball, and possibly the Spanish ACB, but the NCAA is not too far off. NCAA basketball may lack some leadership from older veteran players, but also does not strip away developmental minutes from young players to play older veteran players at or past their peaks. College basketball could improve in different ways to improve its product and as preparation for professional basketball, but it is not an impediment to development for these players. The NBA and the Ignite project, therefore, focused on the wrong age groups (18+), especially now that college players can be paid.
The impediment occurs with older teens (15+) who possess advanced maturity, size, and skills. They play high school and AAU basketball, but there is no true pathway to more competitive options. They can transfer high schools or switch AAU teams to pursue better coaching, more travel, better competition, and more, but these are different degrees of the same thing. There are no opportunities for Flagg (as example) to play with college-age or adult players and teams.
Most countries use a pyramid: Pro league, 1st Division, 2nd Division, 3rd Division, etc. Below senior leagues, or adult basketball, there is youth basketball, often U12, U13, U14, U15, U17, U19 or some variation. Players progress through age groups, but advanced players can progress more quickly. Many play in two age groups; a 15 year-old might play U17 and U19, and an 18-year-old likely plays U19 and on a men’s team, whether the professional team or a lower-division men’s team. My 1st Division men’s teams in Denmark and Estonia featured numerous players still in high school who competed for the men’s team and in age-group competitions. Players are not restricted by age or grade level.
Some countries have development-like U21 or U23 leagues for young professional players not yet ready for the highest level or for young professional players not receiving sufficient minutes. The United States has always had these opportunities with college sports, except a 19-year-old NBA player on the end of the bench could not play a few games with the local college team to receive playing time; the NBA started the G-League to serve this function, and the G-League has been largely successful, as 50% of players on opening night rosters for the 2023-24 NBA season had G-League experience (Singh, 2024).
The argument for academies, although never truly defined, may be to create similar pathways here for the elite teenage players, although the integration with schools likely will prohibit advancement. Flagg cannot play for Montverde Academy and a local college such as Rollins College (NCAA Division 2) or University of Central Florida (NCAA Division 1) because of college admissions, scholarship limitations, and more, whereas a club’s youth players generally do not count against a professional or men’s league roster size; FIBA rules allow only 12 players on a game-day roster, but we probably featured 20 or more players during a 22-game season.
Instead, academies likely would be advanced forms of high-school/AAU basketball, which is not unlike the prep school system already in place. Many prep schools attract the best high-school aged players, some on scholarships and some paying tuition, to play primarily against other highly-rated high-school players and prep schools. Occasionally these prep schools scrimmage college junior-varsity teams or junior-college teams, but the majority of games are against other prep schools. Separating prep schools from high-school competitions, extending the prep-school season to match the school year, and receiving some funding from the NBA to scholarship more players, may be the path of least resistance to implementing an academy-like system in the United States.
Academies in Europe differ by country; some people view the youth setup of a professional club as an “academy” because they sign players from other clubs and countries, whereas some refer to Federation-sponsored programs as the academies. The Helsinki Basketball Academy (HBA) is a federation-run academy in Finland that has received much praise because of the development of a great generation of Finnish players. It is a centralized program that selects players to live (if not from nearby), train, and play for the Academy in an attempt to develop better players and future national team players. Some entrepreneurs have started privately-run and operated academies in a few countries to sign, develop, and ultimately transfer talented players.
Estonia, the example with which I am most familiar, has a federation-sponsored academy that selects the top high-school players for participation. The team participates in the Men’s 1st Division against opponents with players from 16 to 40 years old, some with professional American imports. As the youngest team in the league, the academy generally finishes in the bottom two, despite recruiting the top teenage talents (not all the top players join the academy, as some stay with their home clubs, and others are recruited to academies abroad).
Beyond the 22-game league season, the players are allowed to participate in the cup competition with their home clubs in the fall and the age-group playoffs with their home club in the spring. The cup competition could add a maximum of four games, and the playoffs could add a maximum of six games when I was there, but I believe they changed the format and it could be up to 10 games. Therefore, players play a maximum of 36 games, although reaching the maximum would be virtually impossible.
An Academy like this, therefore, would be like the Ignite, allowing teenagers to play in a professional league against men. What is the point of an academy that plays against players of the same age? Alternatively, maybe the Academy could help players graduate early from high school and receive accreditation as a university and compete against NCAA programs. Would the Ignite generate more interest if it played in the SEC? Would playing for the Ignite at 16-18 years old and playing NCAA Division 1 competition be better than playing for a prep school? Would the Ignite be eligible for the SEC and NCAA Tournaments? Would fans be happy watching the Ignite win an NCAA Championship?
We had a player originally from my club play with the academy when I was there. He played the regular season and in one cup game for us, as he missed time with injury and illness. Our players played the 22 1st Division league games, three 1st Division playoff games, four U18 cup games, four league playoff games, two men’s cup games, a preseason tournament with two games, 14 U18 league games, and 12 EYBL games (should have been 17, but we could not fit the third stage into our schedule). They played roughly 60 games, although nobody played every game, and some also played with our 2nd Division Men’s team. The players who did not suffer any injuries played 55-60 games. We competed in the men’s playoffs, the U18 final four, won a cup championship, won an EYBL stage, and won the EYBL championship. Not only did we play more games, we played more game with something (trophies) at stake.
The real negative for the Academy is the age-group league, as the academy players do not compete during the regular season, making those games less competitive. Imagine a city with 10 high schools that strips the high schools of the best 15-20 players for a prep school to compete against other city’s prep schools. The high-school league is no longer as competitive when each team misses its best player or two. Then, the prep school players rejoin for the high-school playoffs, which throws off the seedings and takes away playing time from those who played all season. As an example, we beat the team we played in the first round of the playoffs by 50 late in the regular season, but the club had two academy players; our playoff games were much more competitive. Our best player regularly skipped our regular season games because they were uncompetitive when we played our best 12 against another club missing two players at the academy.
Many who experience this in smaller countries cite the academies as a problem, especially on the girls’ side. Decreasing participation numbers and competitiveness hurts the U18 leagues and ultimately the women’s league, as players tend to retire earlier due to decreased funding and the lack of depth becomes noticeable. Estonia really only has two women’s teams at its highest level, which becomes cyclical as the lack of opportunities to play with and against older players hinders the development of the next talented young players, and the lack of numbers encourages the academy, which further reduces the numbers and competitiveness.
The United States has more players and more top players, and likely could sustain the loss of some talented players to some form of an academy system, but who benefits and how? The U.S. system is not perfect, but are academies the solution?
The big problem is the distinct set points for progression, as not every player is ready to transition from high-school to college basketball at 18 years old, and not every 16 year-old benefits from playing only against high-school competition. These problems now manifest themselves in NCAA basketball, as Power 5 coaches prefer proven college players over freshmen. Essentially, the NIL is creating a tiered system due to the wildly different finances of programs, and the transfer portal enables players the opportunity to treat their first program like a junior college, performing, improving, and maturing to move to the financially-backed programs. We blame the NIL and transfer portal because the disruption is new, and we like simple causal explanations, but the changes have empowered movement that should have been possible all along. Why should a player’s level from 18-22 be determined by coach’s opinions of the player at 16 or 17 years old? Why shouldn’t players be allowed to move to more competitive programs once they have shown they are among the best at a lower level?
The school system provides many advantages for participation, but restricts promotion and progression (and regression; why can’t an undeveloped senior play on a junior-varsity team just because he or she is a senior?). A 15 year-old plays varsity basketball against 18 year olds and excels, but has nowhere else to go until he or she is 18, unless the player chooses to transfer (to play at essentially the same level +/-) or leaves home to go to a prep school. Would academies change this? Would it be a positive change?
College players are paid now, which changed the entire college model. Why not change age requirements? Nearly every college has a special admissions process currently used by its athletics programs; why not extend that to enable talented high-school athletes to matriculate prior to high-school graduation?
Maybe use junior-colleges for this purpose, allowing talented 16-18 year olds to play junior college basketball, while completing their high-school studies and earning college credit, as many students do currently. I stopped recruiting a player because she had nearly completed her AA during her last two years of high school in dual enrollment. If students can dual enroll, why can’t dual-enrolled players participate for both teams? She could have been a junior-college backup point guard as a 16 year-old high-school junior; she scrimmaged with us and played open gym; she could have handled it, and she took classes on our campus already.
The only reason we ignore these solutions is because they go against our norms and traditions, which have developed around the school system schedules. We would rather see prep-school like academies than allow dual-enrolled athletes to challenge themselves, just like many dislike players transferring to new schools to challenge and showcase themselves against better competition.
We are stuck with an outdated mindset of determining progressions and promotions based on one specific moment in time (14 years old, 18 years old) rather than allowing more flexibility for individuals to progress and regress at their own pace. Players should not have to expedite their development or hold back their academic progress to be prepared to matriculate to a college program at 18 years old, but that is currently the only way.
Before we create an academy system or the new Ignite program or whatever the NBA and/or USA Basketball envision for developing better players, we should examine the problems created by the specific points of progression and the lack of flexibility around these specific dates to challenge players and provide alternate pathways for those who need more time and those who need greater competition at an earlier age.
Singh, S. (2024). NBA teams and their G League affiliates: History, salary, more. NBC Los Angeles, February 14.
Yes. You’ve identified the major problem. NBA/USA Basketball must be the authority.
When it comes to youth basketball and player development in this country, everything is just way too decentralized.
Even if you had the perfect plan— who implements it? Who regulates what the various AAU programs, CYO leagues, etc, are doing? And without that kind of oversight and control, how would you even know if it’s working?