Talent Identification, development, and the NBA Draft

Talent development is a multifactorial process beginning with identification and selection.

A video circulated during the lead up to the 2024 NBA Draft in which Klutch agent Rich Paul appeared to criticize new University of Arkansas head coach John Calipari on Gilbert Arenas’ podcast. He spoke about a player apparently ranked 12th before matriculating to the University of Kentucky who finished his one-year in college ranked much lower.

After the 2024 NBA Draft, many people highlighted the Milwaukee Bucks’ picks since drafting Giannis Antetokounmpo, of whom only Donte DiVincenzo has developed into an NBA regular, to demonstrate poor talent identification and selection after shocking most fans with their first-round selection (and before they made a solid second-round selection).

I am uninterested in the specific players, as I had not heard of either; consequently, I have no opinion about their recruitment, rankings, or selection. Likewise, I have no interest in judging Calipari’s coaching or the Bucks’ drafting. However, these criticisms are informative for a general discussion of talent identification and development.

Prep player rankings often are the opinions of one person or a handful of people, and most NBA draft picks do not develop into NBA regulars. There are thousands and thousands of high-school players, not to mention the players in other countries, and nobody can watch enough film or attend enough games to scout every player diligently and authoritatively. Scouts use short cuts based on AAU teams, scholarship offers, prep schools, local coaches, college coach feedback, and more to broaden their opinions, but regardless of one’s scouting acumen, contacts, and diligence, at the end of the day, rankings are subjective, not objective facts. Why not criticize the player’s ranking rather than a perceived lack of development, especially when numerous Kentucky players have over-performed their draft order recently? Suggesting a player did not develop based on his prep ranking is a faulty foundation on which to build an argument.

Similarly, thousands of players graduate every year, and others declare for the draft as underclassmen or international players, and they compete for a handful of spots as NBA rotation players. There are roughly 450 NBA roster spots, plus two-way and exhibit 10 contracts, but around 300 players receive regular rotation minutes. The draftees compete against those 300 players to earn minutes and a rotation spot, while attempting to jump ahead of the 150+ players already on rosters and the thousands of others available to be drafted or signed. Believing the majority of picks, especially when the team’s highest pick was #17, should become rotation players on a team that has competed for championships for the majority of the time is a skewed premise.

There are several easy explanations for a lack of development at the next level, whether that level is high school, varsity, college, or professional. First, the talent does not transfer; things enabling success at one level do not transfer to the next level for a variety of reasons. Second, a lack of opportunity or playing time; it is difficult to develop without experiencing the next level. Third, the lack of fit, whether positional, stylistically, or skill sets and socially, psychologically, or emotionally. Fourth, the coaching staff’s inability to enhance the players’s skills through drills, practice design, instruction, feedback, coaching behaviors, and more. Finally, the individual player may not do what is necessary or currently possess requisite qualities to perform or improve at the next level.

Years ago, I questioned scouts because they always used the coach or the player to excuse their inaccurate player rankings. When they ranked players highly, and other players outperformed them, they blamed the coach’s system, the coach’s coaching, or the player’s work ethic, as opposed to acknowledging the possibility the ranking may have been incorrect or the ranking may not have properly accounted for the different game at the next level.

Often, as an example, I saw taller high-school players (5’10 girls, 6’7 boys) who dribbled competently rated too highly because the scout envisaged a tall point guard, which everyone loves. I saw players who were better than their teammates and competition, and more coordinated than the average player their height, which afforded them the opportunity to dribble more, but who lacked any real point guard skills. They dribbled well against average high-school competition, but would struggle to handle the ball against average college ball pressure, run a pick-and-roll, and self-create shots off the dribble.

Naturally, when they ended up as average wings instead of standout point guards, the scouts questioned their desire and the coach’s system. Their subjective assessment was unfalsifiable, which should question the merits of their scouting. Instead, as with Paul in the interview, many people, especially those invested in the player or the rankings, blamed the coach.

Talent not transferring may be due to poor talent evaluation and identification or an inability to scale or adapt to a new role. These players excelled in open-court games in which they used their height to take longer strides and see over the defense to make easy passes and finish layups. Being a college point guard requires more than layups and easy passes in transition.

The evaluations were overly optimistic, and the players did not scale to their new roles; their initial value was predicated on their positional size, but their size advantage disappeared when playing as a wing. Without the unique quality, they were mediocre shooters and defenders who were unaccustomed to playing away from the ball. Their talent did not transfer, nor scale when moved to a new role against better competition at the next level. They went from being unique, potentially-dominant point guards to average wings. The style of play and competition did not expose these flaws until they reached the next level, but they were evident to those not mislead by their height, coordination, and basic dribbling and open-court skills.

Teams who recruit or draft potential players need to understand the time required to develop potential. They need a plan to optimize development, whether stashing the player in the G-League to get repetitions or force-feeding minutes in games regardless of the effect on the outcome.

The 11th or 12th player on a college or professional team will not receive sufficient playing time or practice repetitions to improve greatly, unless there is a specific impediment to playing time the staff addresses. A college freshman, especially a late bloomer or a post player, may lack the strength to stay on the court, and a year of consistent strength work could cause sufficient improvement headed into their second seasons. However, few basketball-specific problems can be solved simply with practice repetitions. Players need games to adapt to the next level, adjust to the speed and strength, and identify specific weaknesses to improve through dedicated and specific practice.

Working out against managers is insufficient. The rotation players are ahead of them; they need to make a leap to catch and surpass current rotation players. They need actual game repetitions to improve.

Many players struggle due to a lack of fit. College coaches have an advantage over NBA General Managers because they recruit and sign the players they will coach. I know some higher-ranked players may not excel in our system or style of play, whereas a lower-ranked player may look much better in our system. The fit elevates one player, but not another. One player responds better to my style of coaching than another. The ranking is not necessarily incorrect, and my coaching or style of play is not better simply because one player outperforms a higher-ranked player. Understanding the fit is important when identifying and selecting players because ultimately the goal is to find players who will perform or over-perform for a specific team.

Hopefully NBA General Managers and Head Coaches are aligned in their system of play and player evaluations, but a GM may select a player because of his value as an asset, not necessarily his fit with the coach. The coach may coach to maximize performance this season, whereas the GM may have a five-year plan. The player may fit the five-year plan, but not the next game.

Scouts often talk about drafting the best player available, but what happens when the best player available does not fit the team’s or coach’s style? Some players are so good, they warrant changing the system to maximize their talent; you do not draft Stephen Curry to stand in the corner as a three-point threat. Many teams have players currently and potentially better than draftee; why change to accommodate a rookie?

If the coach runs a five-out system requiring posts to handle the ball away from the basket, read the play, and make quick decisions, is it wise to draft a rim-running, shot-blocking center with no experience making plays outside the three-second area? Should scouts account for the player’s fit within the team when determining the best player available, similar to a college coach accounting for current players, graduating seniors, and style of play when deciding which players to pursue?

The identification, opportunities, and fit may be present, but coaches and general managers also must assess the strengths and weaknesses of their staffs in terms of player development when signing or drafting for potential not immediate production. If the five-out team needs a backup center for immediate minutes, and the draftee has shown potential to play away from the basket, is the staff equipped to develop the potential? Did the staff develop the skills of the starter or did they acquire an established player who possessed the desired skills and experience?

San Antonio (now Oklahoma City) believed strongly in Chip Engelland’s ability to develop shooters, which enabled them to gamble on players who lack shooting but possess other desirable qualities, such as positional size and length, on-ball defensive movement, finishing skills, and more. New Orleans (now Detroit) felt the same about Fred Vinson. They gambled on players who were a jump shot away from being stars or far above-average starters and trusted their staff to develop the weaknesses. Understanding a staff’s strengths and weaknesses should inform recruiting, drafting, and talent identification. Often, college coaches recruit players believing they can develop their shooting once they get to campus, but they have no process or track record for developing shooting skills.

Finally, and ultimately, talent development starts with the player. The identification may be correct, the coaches may be in place, the fit might be perfect, but if the player is unwilling (attitude, desire, maturity) or unable (injury, illness) to practice diligently, the other things do not matter.

I attended an NBA team’s offseason workouts one summer, and an assistant coach asked a veteran about a rookie. The veteran acknowledged the player’s talent and fit, and praised the assistant coach for his player development, but said the team should trade the rookie immediately if they could get anything of value because he stayed out all night, ate McDonald’s, and did not take care of his body like a professional athlete. The veteran did not believe the player would overcome his entourage, lack of maturity, and poor habits (he did, although he almost was bounced from the league). Players must want to improve and perform; a great environment can assist development, and bad environments can handicap players, but without the desire, focus, concentration, motivation, work ethic, and more, the environment will fail. Everything starts with the individual.

These external judgements are difficult because player identification, player development, and coaching are intertwined. One cannot be separated completely from the others to identify which failed in a specific instance.

One perceived failure may not be an indictment of the process, the coach, or the player: The rate of success when transitioning from one level to the next is relatively low. Often, there is nobody to blame; it happens. The player learns from the experience and realizes he or she could have done more or done better at something; hopefully, the coach examines the coaching to see what could have been done better or differently; and the GM should reflect on the evaluation process to see if improvements can be made.

The key is for the player, coach, scouts, and management to be aligned quickly and working in the same direction, which often does not happen in today’s game with multiple coaches, trainers, scouts, agents, silos, and more involved in every team and player.