The Socio-Cultural Influence of FIBA Rules
Team Building with Generalists
I spent a year in Sweden as an exchange student when I was 18 years old. Every few weeks, I wrote a newsletter-style letter back home (pre-email) about impressions beyond my daily life. One explained the socio-cultural influences on sports. I did not use such terminology, but I discussed the differences between typically European/International sports (especially at that time) such as soccer, rugby, water polo, and team handball, which tend to be more collective sports, and typically American sports, such as basketball, baseball, and football, which tend to be more individualistic. These differences reflected the social norms of their societies. Sweden provided health care, free education though university, basic income for students over 18, pensions, and more: A far more socialistic, collective society than the United States, which prided itself on individual freedoms, including the freedom to pay for university, health care, etc.
Times have changed some, especially with the Internet and easier and more affordable travel shrinking the world, but some socio-cultural norms remain within our sports. Some have been noticeable as NBA players (and especially the North American NBA players) play with FIBA rules during the 2023 FIBA World Cup.
NBA rules favor the individual; FIBA rules emphasize the collective. Most specifically, the NBA has a deeper three-point line (23’9 to 22’1) and the defensive three-second rule. The NBA also whistles more fouls, especially in favor of drivers and shooters, whereas FIBA tends to allow more defensive contact. FIBA tends to call more travels on first-step drives as well.
The deeper three-point line creates more space for individual, isolation play. The defensive three-second rule prohibits traditional zone defenses and prevents bigger players from staying in the three-second area to prevent easy baskets. The quicker whistles to protect drivers and shooters, and the lack of whistles on drivers’ first steps (and the slight variation in the way traveling is written in NBA versus FIBA rules) also emphasize individual, isolation play.
Teams must work together to create open shots when space is reduced, big guys can sit in the three-second area, and defenders can be more physical with drivers and shooters around the basket. One cannot expect a superstar to isolate and get to the rim for a highlight reel dunk. Instead, teams attempt to move the ball side to side, cut, and screen, moving the defense and attempting to move the big away from the basket in an effort to create good shots.
Often, these changes are attributed to offense, and the desire for American audiences to see more points, but, in reality, these rule changes emphasize individual play and help to create superstars. The biggest change to increase scoring is playing eight additional minutes compared to FIBA rules. Americans, whether in society, sports, or the rules of the game, value and reward individuals.
The problem for the USA team (whether or not they ultimately win) is the team tends to be selected like an all-star team, and not a team designed to win in the international game. The best NBA players in a ball-centric, well-spaced court are not necessarily the best FIBA players with the reduced space and greater emphasis on ball and player movement.
Team USA features predominantly ball-dominant players. These players know how to move off the ball, but these are not their habits. Most, likely from their early days in AAU and high-school basketball, have been the center of attention, handling the ball and making plays on a high percentage of possessions. Years of ball dominance have engrained habits to wait for the ball or to get the ball from a teammate to isolate out of the triple threat or off the dribble to create a shot. They have lost their off-ball cutting instincts, and the lack of preparation time is insufficient to adjust, as might be expected when a bunch of equally-talented players come together and realize they cannot all possess the ball on every possession.
The few off-ball players on the team tend to be spot-up shooters (Portis, Johnson), not cutters or movement shooters, and the shorter three-point line means these spot-up shooters are closer to their defenders. Jason Hart is really the only off-ball mover, but he is not a movement shooter. The team is limited in its player movement, and thus must rely on its ball skills and isolation play and then quick ball movement when the initial attempt is stopped with help defense and rotations. This does not preclude the team from winning, but this is a very general overview of its differences with the more European teams, such as Serbia or Lithuania. These differences largely stem from the rule differences that influence the way the game is played in different parts of the world, and these rule differences reflect different socio-cultural norms.
Team Building with Generalists
I follow a Twitter account (@nonewthing) that has described generalist versus specialist player profiles in soccer over the last month. Generalists and specialists received some notoriety after David Epstein wrote Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World in 2019, but I heard the concept from Vern Gambetta roughly 20 years ago. Gambetta once wrote about dinosaurs being extinct because they were highly specialized, whereas cockroaches survive because they are adaptable. I wrote a blog around 2005 about my attraction to and interest in coaching being because it was one of the last great generalist professions: A great coach must be proficient in many different areas, from leadership to psychology to biomechanics to physiology to pedagogy and more.
As Gambetta wrote, specialists are adapted; they may thrive in one environment or role, but struggle in another. Generalists are adaptable to different roles and environments. As an example, in my second college assistant coaching job, I worked for a woman who had been successful at a more suburban school using a somewhat complex, methodical 1-4 high offensive system. Our school attracted a more diverse student-athlete, a greater mix of suburban and urban, and previous experiences. We were a more athletic, faster, smaller team than that to which she was accustomed, but she attempted to use the same offensive system. We struggled. She was a specialist. She knew one way. She struggled to adapt when the players did not fit. We committed 50 turnovers in a college basketball game against a bad team! When we changed our system, simplifying and playing to our best players’ strengths, we increased our scoring average by almost 20 points per game and upset a top 5 team. The players were not bad, but they also were not adaptable. The coach was a specialist, and the players were largely specialists, but their specialties did not match. Neither was adaptable. That caused the struggles; the mismatch.
“The more talent a player possesses, the more his profile expands on the specialist-generalist spectrum: Positional versatility; Different roles/playing contexts in the same position; Ability to roam and look natural across the pitch: This defines a generalist,” explained @nonewthing.
To expand on his work, as I understand it, using a basketball spin, Nikola Jokic is a generalist profile. Most post players, even great post players, are specialists because they can play only one position and can be exploited. As skilled and talented as Joel Embiid is, he can be played off the court and made ineffective through creating mismatches, forcing him away from his spot, and/or double-teaming him.
Jokic is the atypical center because he uses his size, hands and intelligence to defend capably enough, and offensively, there is no answer: He has footwork and great touch at the basket, shoots well from the three-point line, and is most dangerous as a passer. Teams cannot double him because he punishes them with the pass, but virtually nobody can defend him one-vs-one, whether he is close to the basket or at the three-point line.
Jokic can function in different positions; he is equally-adept as a center or a point guard. He plays at the top of the key and handles in transition, but also can post on the block. It is reasonable to assume he could operate out of the corners as well if necessary, but that would limit his influence on the game. He can win games as a passer and a scorer. He is the ultimate generalist.
“Generalists are the possible best and higher ranking talents than specialists in most cases,” (@nonewthing). Jokic is better than Embiid for this reason. Teams can game-plan to take away Embiid, especially during the postseason with the greater intensity and more detailed scouting. Teams are unable to take away Jokic. Jokic is ahead of Giannis Antetokounmpo because teams can game-plan to limit Giannis’ drives and force him into jump shots. It is not easy, but it is possible. Teams cannot back off Jokic because of his shooting, and they cannot double because of his passing.
Teams built around generalists are more difficult to defeat in the playoffs, whereas specialists may be able to keep pace during the regular season. In the last dozen years, Giannis and the 2021 Milwaukee Bucks are the closest to being led by a specialist. The other champions were led by players such as Jokic, LeBron James, Kevin Durant, Steph Curry, and Kawhi Leonard, the epitome of generalists. Giannis, to me, is close to a specialist because of his lack of shooting, but he also offers huge versatility defensively.
Generalists make team-building easier: Jokic and Curry can excel with almost anyone as a teammate. The Warriors can acquire Chris Paul because Curry can function on the ball as well as off the ball, whereas Kyrie Irving and James Harden did not enhance each other’s skills because neither plays as well off the ball as on the ball. Curry enhanced Durant’s skills with his off-ball play, while Durant is also a devastating shooter when Curry is on the ball.
Curry can score off the dribble, off the catch, at the rim, and far beyond the three-point line; he can handle the ball to defeat pressure and make the pass to defeat a double team. He excels in any position or any role. His gravity alone makes his teammates better.
Team USA is built around specialists. Compounding the problem, the team is built around the same type of ball-dominant, score-first specialists: Anthony Edwards, Jalen Brunson, Brandon Ingram, Paolo Banchero, and Austin Reaves. This is not to diminish their abilities. However, winning with a team filled with ball-dominant players has proven difficult in the NBA (Kyrie, Harden, KD; LeBron, AD, Westbrook), despite teams being anointed champions after the acquisitions, and FIBA does not reward the ball-dominant, score-first isolation players as in the NBA. Therefore, this team construction may or may not work in the NBA, but definitely creates hurdles in FIBA.
Tyrese Haliburton and maybe Mikal Bridges are the potential generalists, but they typically come off the bench. The team seems to be built around Brunson and Edwards, two different but overlapping players who excel best with the ball in their hands. Beyond Hart (maybe Reaves), Team USA lacks a natural cutter. Even the off-ball players — Jaren Jackson, Jr., Cam Johnson and Bobby Portis — typically make their offensive contributions through three-point spot-up shooting. They lack a movement shooter like Curry.
A more balanced lineup would feature Haliburton, Hart, Bridges, JJJ and one of the ball-dominant specialists (Edwards in a smaller lineup; Banchero in a bigger lineup). That lineup is built around the generalists, the off-ball mover, one on-ball specialist, and one off-ball, spot-up specialist. Alternatively, Walker Kessler could be the cutter for Hart (potentially with Johnson for JJJ as the spot-up shooter). This is not the most talented lineup for an all-star game, but a FIBA World Championship should not be approached like an all-star game.
Assuming the A team plays next year, there are fewer issues because the elite, top tier players are generalists; they can play in different positions, on and off the ball. Curry, Durant, Kawhi, Jimmy Butler, LeBron, AD, Bam Adebayo offer plenty of generalist players. The remainder of the roster can utilize specialists: A defensive guard such as Marcus Smart or Davion Mitchell; a movement shooter such as Kevin Huerter or Desmond Bane; a cutter such as Aaron Gordon; a stationary shooter with size such as Brook Lopez. My 12th spot would go to another point guard like Haliburton who can be effective as a low usage player and play with Curry to move him off the ball. The exact players are not as important as the profiles.
Simply selecting the 12 best players who want to play is not the best method of team-building. Players should be selected for certain profiles. Because the NBA has de-emphasized post defense, offensive rebounding (contested defensive rebounding), off-ball cutting (and passing to the cutters), and movement shooting, these profiles need to be added to surround the generalists and the superstars. Sure, Jayson Tatum is better than Kevin Huerter, but does the team need another ball-dominant scorer? Donovan Mitchell and Dame Lillard are better than Marcus Smart, but does the team need another off-dribble scorer? Dame should replace Curry, if desired, not a different profile.
High-school teams generally do not have sufficient numbers or talent to be concerned with player profiles when selecting teams. However, AAU teams often have some control, especially those that feature the better players. At this developmental level, rather than ignoring talented players to select less-talented players who may function better as role players, coaches should emphasize generalist skills. Rather than playing the best player on the ball every possession of every game, play him or her off the ball and emphasize cutting. Use the best shooters as movement shooters coming off screens, not just standing in the corner shooting spot-up three-pointers. Use post players in the low and high post, not just as shot blockers and rim runners.
When people bemoan the fall of American basketball, largely the problem is a lack of American-born seven-footers with generalist or even specialist low-post skills. Possibly, there are fewer seven-footers born in the United States than in previous generations or maybe just an increase in seven-footers born elsewhere, especially as the developing world improves nutrition and medical care compared to previous generations. Certainly, some seven-footers now are guards, in terms of body proportions, movement, and skills, such as Kevin Durant and Chet Holmgren. But, where is an American player with a body like Jonas Valančiūnas or Steven Adams? Why doesn’t a player like JaVale McGee or DeAndre Jordan possess more similarities with players like Valančiūnas or Alperen Şengün? Will a player like Jarrett Allen or Nic Claxton eventually develop similar width and strength or are we somehow breeding taller players to be long and lean and vertical athletes and sacrificing some of the girth and lower-body strength that helps Jokic, Valančiūnas, and Adams excel despite being labeled as unathletic?
FIBA competition ultimately does not tell us much about the state of the game in the United States because we use different rules, and our players develop to excel in the game played here. The differences and the struggles, win or lose, can point out short-comings within our own system, such as off-ball skills and developing skilled low-post players, which we may or may not care to address within the long-term developmental system. USA Basketball would institute FIBA rules throughout the country if it and its partners were concerned with winning championships, and players throughout the system would adapt and develop to excel in the FIBA game. For a country of individualists who crave superstars (just look at Messi and the MLS), this may not be the best financial decision, and we all know money talks. However, from a basketball development standpoint, at least in terms of the way many coaches and diehard basketball fans want to see the game played, these changes — from a shot clock to prohibiting live-ball timeouts, to allowing more defensive contact on drives, and more — would improve the game at every level.