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Social media coaches criticize early-maturing players who win with size and strength, not skill, while also criticizing those who are held back in school, often due to late birthdays and/or later maturing.
Birth-month advantages are well-established; players picked for teams in adolescence tend to be from the first three months of the year. In the United States, with a largely school-based system, the birth-month advantage often moves to the last three months, as age on September 1 determined school grade. As an example, my younger sister has an early August birthday, and I have a late September birthday; we were born 23 months apart, but we were only one class apart in school. She was among the youngest in her class, and I was among the oldest in my class prior to high school. However, I was among the youngest on my Little League and AYSO teams, which used the January 1 cutoff, and played primarily with teammates who were a grade ahead of me in school.
The underdog effect describes the advantage gained by those born late in the year once the physical and maturity differences dissipate. Those who stay in the competitive stream eventually have an advantage, as, in essence, they played up an age group for their entire lives, competing against players with greater physical size and maturity.
These effects are based on chronological birthdates; biological age and physical maturity do not develop linearly with chronological age. These are generalizations. A 14-year-old born in January is likely to be more mature and further along into puberty when the season starts in November than a 13-year-old born in December, despite being in the same age category. An eleven-month difference is inconsequential for 25-year-olds, but a large difference in adolescence. The 14-year-old easily could be closer to 15 or 16 in biological age, whereas the 13-year-old could be closer to 12.
These advantages and disadvantages often are discussed and criticized online, although the specific terms and definitions are used infrequently. People complain about grade holdbacks gaming the system or criticize young players who dominate early due to size, speed, and strength, but lack skill. These athletes frequently reach early plateaus, which cause problems, as the adolescent stars are no longer the best players, but many often fail to realize others have eclipsed them due to an anchoring bias.
Choosing and platforming the bigger, stronger, faster players at young ages is seen as a win-now, anti-development decision, and we fear for the less-physical players who are overlooked. For example, many suggest Lionel Messi never would have succeeded in the United States because coaches would have cut him at a young age due to his lack of size and speed, despite his skills. Obviously, we cannot test this hypothesis, but it overlooks two factors: First, I have seen many less-physical players given opportunities while refereeing soccer; second, the average European club tends to be just as win-now focused as the average American club.
Generally, we see win-now and development as diametrically-opposed ideas. A coach either coaches to win or coaches to develop players, but doing both is impossible. To some degree, I agree, as at some point, the two objectives will come into conflict, and one will take a backseat. For instance, I play 12 players every game in an effort to develop every player, but in one or two games, one or two players played less than five minutes due to the score, rotations, performance, and more. Winning the game took precedence over development in that moment.
However, winning behaviors can be a part of a more developmental mindset. Our club has two teams in the same age group. At the beginning of the year, each had to play in a mini-tournament to qualify for the CLJ, a competition contested among the top 12 teams in the country. Our first three games, therefore, were must-win games, as missing out on this competition would have meant a lost season developmentally for our players, as we would have participated only in our local league. We completed our local league averaging 117 points per game and were +500 in eight games. Winning those initial games guaranteed 11 games against relatively equal competition.
Our other team did not qualify from their group, meaning they play only in the local league. They are not as good as our team, as they are comprised of players a year younger. However, they missed out on these competitive games. In hindsight, knowing what I know now, we should have added one or two stronger players to our other team to qualify, taking a win-now approach in those initial games in an effort to create a more competitive, more intense game schedule in which to provide more developmental opportunities throughout the season. The immediate win-now approach would have improved development over the course of the season.
Another related example occurred years ago when I first watched a future NBA player. He was a skinny 6’6 high-school sophomore, and nobody had realized he was the best player on his team, as he played with a future small college point guard and a future high-major tight end. The two seniors were physically-dominant high-school players with limited futures, whereas the sophomore developed into the NBA player. I watched and asked about the sophomore, but knowledgeable fans directed my attention to the senior point guard, the team’s leading scorer and dominant player. I insisted the sophomore was the best player. He eventually grew and was a 6’10 stretch four in college and the NBA.
The sophomore was the best talent with the most potential, but the physically-mature seniors assisted with his eventual development by insuring he played against better competition and in more meaningful postseason games. Without the seniors, the sophomore likely could not have led the team by himself. Possibly, without the seniors, he would have been pushed into a playmaking role and potentially developed his individual skills to a greater degree. Possibly, without the seniors, he would have played with a lesser point guard and rarely got the ball and played on a team with little success. The mature players guaranteed a high preseason ranking, a more competitive schedule, deep runs in preseason tournaments, playoff qualifications, and a lengthy playoff run. He played more and better competition as a result of these teammates.
In a sense, the early maturing, more physical players pave the road for late developers, provided the late developers stay in the competitive stream. Even this season, I have maintained from the beginning that one or more of our late-developing or younger players will win an important game for us late in the season. However, they were not ready to win those games for us in August. We needed the more mature, more physical players early in the season to guarantee we would be in position to play the more important games late in the season. The more competitive schedule provides more opportunities for the late-maturers to develop, to realize their potential and be key contributors.
In reality, I may be wrong. They may not develop quickly enough or overtake their peers competitively this year. Regardless, they remain in the system, and if they work and progress, their opportunity may come next year or the next year. Nobody realized the sophomore was an NBA prospect until after his freshman year of college, after he grew a few more inches and demonstrated that his skills transferred to a Power 5 level. His high-school coach was not wrong to platform the seniors and use him as a complementary piece; that was where he was in his development, and the win-now, physical, high-school stars pushed him into more competitive, more meaningful games against better opposition that afforded him more opportunities to grow, challenge himself, and expand his game. The win-now playoff games also increased the opponent’s scouting and attempts to limit their best players, creating the need for the sophomore to do more, thus exhibiting his potential in a bigger environment than would have been possible without his mature teammates. Similarly, I expect one or more of my late-developers to have the breakthrough later in the year when teams attempt to limit our more mature, and thus currently better players.
Birth-age effects and the underdog effect are real. Rather than criticize players who rely on size and strength, we should appreciate the role they serve for the late developers, while also encouraging them to expand their skills so they are not automatically overtaken by the late developers. For us, that means pushing our more mature players onto older teams where they become the younger players fighting against the older, more physically-developed players. Unfortunately, in the United States, this is not realistic, as, for instance, the high-school senior could not practice and play simultaneously with the local college team, even if physically-prepared for the competition and needing a greater challenge because one must graduate first and playing at multiple levels simultaneously is disallowed. Trainers with mixed-age groups currently provide the best environment for these greater challenges for varsity high-school players as they often train with the other, best varsity players, as well as college and professional players; citywide summer pro-am leagues provide similar mixed-age participation to augment normal high-school competition.
Embracing these win-now situations and players is not forgoing a developmental approach, unless the winning replaces the development and the coach ignores the younger, less mature players or fails to challenge the win-now players to grow and expand their games. Playing to win and development can exist side by side when approached correctly, as the winning leads to more games, better games, and greater competition in which to challenge players to grow and expand.